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ERIC M FREEDMAN

Libel Law And The
Preservation Of The Republic 1787-1825
To study the legal history of a particular time
period without considering at least its intellectual
and political histories is to emasculate both law and
history. Such an approach makes of the law a series
of doctrines related only to each other, and of history a series of discrete events perhaps not even
related to each other. A portrait of the intellectual
and political developments bearing on the period
1787-1825 is, to say the least, outside the scope of
this paper. However, before we move into the
slightly more negotiable thicket of a sketch of the
development of certain aspects of libel' law in this
period, let us take a brief look at the forest.
If there was one thing upon which virtually the entire revolutionary generation could agree, it was the belief that republican governments were closely dependent upon a broad distribution of virtue among the people. Virtue was one of
those marvelously vague yet crucially important concepts
that dotted late-eighteenth-century moral and political
thought ... It signified the personal virtues of industry,
honesty, frugality ... But more importantly, it means as
well ... a willingness to sacrifice personal interest if need be
to the public good. Montesquieu had identified virtue as the
animating spirit of republican societies: and the American
people fully agreed.'

Virtue was especially necessary among those
entrusted with power:
Power made men unscrupulous . . . The possession of power

was seen to unleash men's aggressive instincts, and power3
seeking was associated with antisocial behavior.

In 1815, John Adams said:
The fundamental Article of my political creed is, that

...

ab-

solute power is the same in a Majority of a popular assembly,
an Aristocratical Counsel, an Oligarchical Junto and a single Emperor. Equally arbitrary cruel bloody and in every
4
respect diabolical.

It was also said:
It was assumed that self-interest was the dominant motive of
man's political behavior, and though there was constant
Eric M Freedman BA (Yale) MA (Victoria University of Wellington New Zealand) JD (Yale). Mr Freedman is grateful to
Professor Louis H Pollak of the Yale Law School whose unfailing cheerful guidance was indispensable to the writing of this
paper.

appeals to altruism and patriotism in the political language of
the day, there was little tendency to rely on the success of
such appeals in the ordinary conduct of politics. Selfinterest and.. a lust for power were anticipated.5

This mistrust of those having power was an
important basis for the antiparty ideology of the
period - a period during which observers of the
political scene could see a party system taking
shape. Both parties displayed a notable similarity in
their opposition to parties. The radical Ezra Stiles
said:
It is the insidious art of parties and politicians to keep things
concealed from the people, or it they are alarmed and assemble, to excite parties, sow dissentions, and prevent as
much as possible the question from coming up fairly before
them, instead of harmoniously endeavoring... hones6
tly ... to form and obtain the public mind.

And the aristocratic John Taylor of Caroline
warned:
The danger of parties to free government arises from the
impossibility of controlling them by the restraints of political
law; because being constituted upon selfish views...no
limitation ... stops their career.

..

They are universally dis-

posed to persecute, plunder, oppress and kill...In legislation contrary to genuine republican principles, sustained by
a dominant party zeal, lies, in my view, the greates danger to
the free form of qovernment of the United States.7

Other statements were:
The frenzied political climate... in the 1790's continued
unabated after 1800.8
Jefferson's party .. .soon became the political expression of
those who believed that... society had ... corrupted
instead of ennobled.9
[What] led many Federalists to foresee the demise of their
party [was the] conception of a growing sea of darkness
surrounding a few islands of virtue.10

The War of 1812 did nothing to lessen such concern which existed across the political spectrum.
Andrew Jackson, then a militia commander in
westen Tennessee, said that the United States was
entering the war "to fight for the reestablishment of
our national character." When the conflict was
over, a Pennsylvania Republican summarized it as
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"the triumph of virtue over vice."" A few years
later, John Adams asked Jefferson:

Supreme Court set aside the verdict, however, saying:

Have you found in history one single example of a nation
thoroughly corrupted, that was afterwards restored to
Virtue, and without Virtue, there can be no political Liberty. 12

An absolute and unqualified indemnity from all responsibil-

As late as 1827, when Congress appropriated
money for the establishment of a naval academy,

Basing its opinion on English precedents, the court
concluded:

Representative Lemuel Sawyer of North Carolina protested
that the glamor of a naval education would "produce degeneracy and corruption of the public morality and change our
13
simple Republican habits."

The abuse of the right must be submitted to... as subser-

In looking at the development of the law of libel in
this period, then, it is important to remember that
the opposing political sides considered their differences far from petty. Each group was convinced
that the activities of unscrupulous men (the other
side) could endanger the very survival of republican
institutions, which were historically fragile.14
Even without a profound knowledge of specific
political developments, the influence of political
events on legal ones in this period is apparent. The
trials under the Sedition Act' 5 are obvious examples, and there are many others. They are multiplied by the fact that most of the libel law in this
period was developed on the state level. New York,
for instance, was particularly fruitful in litigation of
this sort. To take just two examples: between 1812
and 1813, the newspaper editor Southwick was
involved in three libel suits with his political opponents;16 and a governor of the state, Morgan Lewis,
was the plaintiff in a case which (to his advantage)
limited an important doctrine announced in New
York the very same year he brought his action. 7
The desire to keep a close watch on those in
power was manifested in a series of decisions which
developed the doctrine that petitions to a forum
competent to redress the grievances complained of
were not actionable.
In 1802 a petition was presented to the Vermont
legislature "when convened... for the nomination

and appointment of Justices of the Peace." It read in
part:
To the Honourable the Legislature of the State of Vermont... We humbly state [that]... Ebenezer Harris,
Esquire, Justice of the Peace ... is heinously a peacebreaker... which we are ready to prove ... Further... he

ity in the petitioners is indispensable ... for it would be an

absurd mockery in a government to hold out this privilege to
its subjects, and then punish them for the use of it.19

vient to the common welfare ... The Court, therefore, con-

sider that no action can be maintained for a libel upon a
petition for redress of grievances, whether the subject matter of the petition be true or false, simply upon its being
preferred to either branch of the General Assembly, or
20
disclosed to any of its members.

This doctrine was carried a step further in the
1806 case, Reid u Delorme, 21 which held that material in petitions which was defamatory of third parties was protected. Delorme had presented the
legislature a petition against the conduct of the
South Carolina attorney general, who had allegedly
failed to prosecute Reid for harboring stolen slaves.
On the basis of this petition, Reid sued Delorme for
libel and won a judgment at trial; but the Constitutional Court arrested the judgment with this opinion.
Though the conduct of Delorme may have been unreasonable and malicious, yet, in petitioning the legislature against a
public officer he was in the exercise of a constitutional
right. .. There is no ground upon which this action can be
legally supported. Every citizen has a right to petition the
legislature for the redress of grievances, and even on
account of grievances which do not exist, if they are supposed

to

wounded.

22

exist,

although . . .reputations

should

be

Two years later, the New York Court of Errors
handed down the most widely cited decision in this
area. The case is particularly interesting because it
reveals a wide area of agreement between the parties. A man named Thorn had signed a petition
which read:
To the honourable the council of appointment of the state of
New York ... We humbly represent, that the manner in
which the public prosecutions ... have been managed by

the present district attorney . .. is highly improper ... that
malice towards some, and the emoluments arising from the
public prosecutions in other cases, has given rise to many

does not possess ... uprightness... and integrity... Therefore, [we]... do solemnly protest against the appointment
of the said Ebenezer. 18

indictments ... Your petitioners ... therefore ... humbly

The said Ebenezer sued the first signer of the petition for $5,000 and recovered $1.00. The state

Blanchard was dismissed, and brought suit against
Thorn. The defendant brought a bill of exceptions

pray that Anthony I Blanchard, the present district attor23
ney... may be removed from that office.
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from the ruling of the Supreme Court that the evidence was sufficient for Blanchard to maintain his
action. The bill objected to this:
1. Because the council of appointment, to whom the petition was addressed, had competent power to examine the
charges exhibited against the defendant in error;and that to
address a petition to the council of appointment for the
removal of an officer, the tenure of whose office isduring the
pleasure of the council cannot be deemed libellous...
2.... The council having competent authority... it was
incumbent on the defendant to have shown, on the trial,
express malice.2 4

On oral argument, Thorn's counsel freely admitted If this petition had been published in a gazette it would have
been libellous. But, it is not so when presented to the proper
persons who have power to remedy the evil, which was the
subject of the complaint.25

The other side granted this point. They argued
though that the petitioner,
must come into a court of justice with pure hands and
honest intentions, for the purposes of truth and justice;
not. . . to gratify his malice.

26

Further, it was
admitted by the counsel for the defendant in error [Blanchard] that if the paper had been addressed to the house of
assembly, as a grant inquest, no action would be sustained;
and their whole defence rests on its being sent to an
improper or incompetent forum.2 1

A split court, with the judges scattering in reasoning, found in Thorn's favor.
The following year the state Supreme Court, possibly under political pressure, 28 shrank from carrying this doctrine to its logical conclusion. The
plaintiff was the governor of New York,and a candidate for re-election. A public meeting of about 800
citizens, held to nominate an opposition candidate,
adopted an address to the people. This document,
signed by the chairman of the meeting, charged the
governor with various unrepublican actions and
concluded:
He has rendered himself entirely unfit to be continued the
chief magistrate.29

Governor Lewis brought suit against Few, the
chairman. At his trial, Few moved for a non-suit on
the ground that the document in question was an
address to competent authorities asking them to
remove an obnoxious officer. The judge rejected
this contention, saying that to accept it,
would equally authorize an individual to libel the character
of a candidate under the cloak of an address to the people.30

On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the position
of the trial judge. The opinion said:
The doctrine contended for by the defendant's counsel
results in the monstrous position, that every publication,
ushered forth under the sanction of a public political meeting, against a candidate for an elective office, is beyond the
reach of legal inquiry. To such a proposition I can never yield
my assent... I cannot discover any analogy whatever
between the proceedings of such a meeting and those
of. .. organized tribunals known in our law, for the redress
of grievances ... It would...be a monstrous doctrine to

establish, that when a man becomes a candidate for an
elective office, he thereby gives to others a right to accuse
him of any imaginable crimes, with impunity. Candidates
have righs, as well as electors.31

Nonetheless, in 1815 the Constitutional Court of
South Carolina squarely held that the electorate
was the proper tribunal to try the qualifications of
candidates for office. One Richardson had accused
Mayrant, a candidate for Congress, of having a
weakened mind. Mayrant sued, charging that the
accusation had led to his defeat. The court below
supported a general demurrer to the declaraion. 32
Mayrant thereupon brought a motion to overturn
this ruling on the ground that "those words spoken
of a Candidate, were in themselves actionable," or
that they were because of the special damages he
had suffered.33 The Constitutional Court noted that
the words imputed a misfortune, not a crime, and
continued:
It is not pretended that those words spoken of a private
individual would be actionable. And I am not aware of any
principle... by which a person by proclaiming himself a
candidate ... becomes so far elevated above the common

level of mankind, as to entitle him to any exclusive privileges. On the contrary, when one becomes a candidate for
public honors, he makes a profert of himself for public
investigation. 34

Although the court found the words not actionable
"and if they are not actionable, falsehood and
malice cannot make them so"36 - it went on to say:
It is established ... that where words, otherwise actionable,
are spoken in the course of a regular proceeding before a
tribunal having jurisdiction of the matter, no action will
lie ... The case under consideration is not distinguishable

from these. The letters in which the supposed libellous
matter was contained, were addressed to the electors of the
district in which the plaintiff offered himself as a candidate,
and by one having a common interest with them; they were
the proper ... tribunal. The charge related altogether to the
plaintiff's qualifications for the place. .. No person has a
right in such a case to impute ... crimes. But talents and

qualifications for office are mere matters of opinion.36
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As this decision indicates, there existed a similar
line of cases holding that words published in the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings were not
actionable unless published maliciously.37
In an 1807 case, a witness brought suit against a
defendant who said in court upon hearing his testimony: "That is a lie and Ican prove it."38 Without
discussing whether the words were mateial to the
accused's defense or whether they actually imputed
a charge of perjury, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held:
the words ... were spoken in a court of law ... in a court of

justice;.. . they are not actionable; nothing is more common
that for a party to say in his defence, that the evidence given
against him is not true, and that he can prove it.

But that same year, in a similar case, a Pennsylvania
court gave a somewhat narrower interpretation.
During a trial, Palmer said that Vigours had previously taken a false oath and that he would prove it.
Vigours sued Palmer for slander:

"mere pretence under the cloak of a prosecution," 45
granted a new trial. The court said:
If an action would lie for words uttered before a justice,
when applied to in good faith for a warrant to apprehend the
felon, the culprit might escape for want of prosecution: for
of slander,
but few would subject themselves to the action
46
by endeavoring to bring to justice offenders.

the parallel
Three years later, the same court made
47
ruling concerning words in a writ.
Both in the case of petitions and that of judicial
proceedings, however, the courts did sometimes
permit the plaintiff to maintain his action where
there was a showing that the defendant had brought
the original charges maliciously. In Bodwell u
Osgood,
the supposed libel was a written communication ... addressed to the committee of a school district ... in which the
defendant, after stating that he had been informed that
the committee had employed the plaintiff to teach the
school in that district .. .remonstrates against the appointment, and accuses the plaintiff of want of chastity in several
48
instances, and pledges himself to prove the charges.

For the defendant it was contended that the words were
used in the course of a judicial investigation of a subject in
which the defendant was interested, and therefore were not
40
actionable.

The jury returned a verdict of $1,400 for Bodwell.
The defendant moved for a new trial, because:

Vigours nonetheless recovered $100, and Palmer
appealed. The court of review agreed and said:

No action will lie on the supposed libel, however false and
to
malicious it may have been, for that it was a petition
49
the... body of men authorized to grant redress.

The law is clear, where words are spoken by the counsel, or
by a party, which are necessary to hisdefence and pertinent
to the issue, they are not the ground for an action of
slander. 41 [But] the point before the Court [below] was
really a question of fact, viz. whether... the words had
reference to the cause then depending.. or whether they
42
were uttered wantonly.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court denied the
motion for a new trial, saying:

Considering this point to have been resolved by the
verdict, the court refused to disturb it.
The regular course of judicial proceedings was
also deemed to include applications for warrants,
and the contents of writs. In Bunton v Worley, the
latter brought a slander suit against the former for
words imputing a felony:
The words were spoken in part before a justice of the peace,
on ... application for a warrant.43

At his trial, Bunton
moved for instructions to the jury, that if they were of the
opinion... that the words spoken before the justice, were
spoken in the course of the application to prosecute in good
faith the plaintiff, and not for the purpose of slandering him,
44
the defendant was not liable.

This motion was overruled. But the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, although it denied protection to
cases where the application for a warrant was

We consider the fact established by the verdict, that the
accusation was false ... and that the defendant knew it tobe
false at the time of publication. It may, therefore, be admitted, that if the defendant had proceeded with honest intentions, believing the accusation to be true, although in fact it
50
was not, he would be entitled to protection.

Similarly, in 1803 the Constitutional Court of
South Carolina had reversed the non-suiting of a
plaintiff in a case where the defendant had brought
him up for investigation before a military court of
inquiry. The Constitutional Court found that the
conduct of the defendants was not in accord with
martial law, but said that even if
the charges ... were made... in strict conformity to law, yet
if the same be falsely made, with a malicious intention ...
and without ... probable cause, the plaintiff would be
5
entitled to maintain his action. '

Nonetheless, the thrust of the cases in this area
was not favorable to plaintiffs - including plaintiffs
who might happen to be public officers. The range
of situations that could be included within these
doctrines was expanding. By 1824 it included complaints made to a church against one of its members
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by people who were not members. In taking this
position, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said:
The law is, that accusations made to a body competent to
try the offense cannot be the subject of an action for slander. .. if the church sustain the complaint, and the accused
submit to their dealing and discipline, it is enough, without
evidence of express malice, to excuse the defendant... That... the plaintiff may show that injustice was done

him by the church ... will not affect the defence, which rests
only on the institution of the complaint for the purpose of
causing an inquiry in an ordinary way; the subsequent
procedings were not under the control of the defendants,
and however irregular they may have been, cannot prejudice their defence. 52

Another series of decisions which would tend to
make public officers think twice about bringing libel
actions was that which developed the notion that
such officers could only maintain their suits upon a
showing that the words complained of were related
to their official capacities. This would tend to make
it difficult for officials to use private libel actions as a
method for obtaining revenge against individuals
who had stood in their way politically.53
In 1799 one Farrington allegedly said: "Squire
Oakley is a damned rogue." The full opinion of the
New York Supreme Court non-suiting Oakley
reads:
These words spoken of a common person are held not to be
actionable. Although in this case they were spoken of a
magistrate, they had no relation to his official character or
conduct. They are, therefore, not more actionable than if he
was not in office, or if they were spoken of any other
4
individual.5

It is true that this rule could sometimes work to
the benefit of the plaintiff. For example, when a
defendant said of a county sheriff that "monies
which he had collected on execution he had taken
and converted to his own use," it was held that the
words were actionable because they amounted to a
charge of malpractice in office.55 Similarly, the circuit court for the District of Columbia said in 1800 :
There is no doubt that words not actionable when spoken of
a common person may become actionable when spoken of
56
an officer, and in relation to his official conduct.

The cases were generally in favor of the defendant. An action was brought in 1805 for these
words:
I have frequently seen him drunk as a coot in the assembly of
this state ... He was unfit for a member of the assembly, and
if his character were known to the electors... they would
not elect him to represent them in the assembly.57

The court specifically conceded that "there was a

discourse concerning the plaintiff's fitness for the
office of member of the legislature," but said that
the action must fail for want of a showing of injury to
his trade.5 8 Such a requirement would hardly seem
encouraging to any other legislator contemplating a
libel action.
The American desire to keep a close check on
those in power also seems to be at the root of the
erosion of the rule which had long been established
in England that the truth of the published words was
no defense against a charge of criminal libel. 59 Even
the Sedition Act specifically allowed the introduction of truth as a defense.60 Nevertheless, republics
were also thought to be vulnerable to a lack of virtue
among ordinary citizens. With the exception of
prosecutions brought under the Sedition Act, there
is not a single criminal case in this time period where
the court permitted an attempt to justify the words
by proving their truth. 6 1
One of the early cases did come close to allowing
such a justification. In the 1804 case, The People v
Croswell, the defendant was charged with libelling
President Jefferson by saying that he had paid Callender 62 for defaming Washington and Adams.
After being found guilty, Croswell moved for a new
trial because, inter alia, he should have been
allowed to give the truth of his accusations in evidence. The reviewing court split evenly on this
question, thus letting the verdict stand.63 Those
who were for overturning it suggested that the rule
barring the truth from evidence originated in the
discredited Star Chamber, and was inconsistent
with American notions of freedom of the press. One
of these judges wrote:
I adopt ... the ... definition of one of the counsel at the bar,

that the liberty of the press consists in the right to publish,
with impunity, truth, with good motives, and for justifiable
ends, whether it respects government magistracy or individuals. 64

The remaining judges, resting squarely on the common law, wrote:
Truth may be as dangerous to society as falsehood, when
exhibited in a way calculated to disturb the public tranquility.65

This latter view, with provision for a gradually
increasing number of exceptions, remained the law
throughout our period. In Commonwealth v Clap,
the defendant had posted notices in several places
stating that a certain auctioneer 66 was "a liar, a
scoundrel, a cheat and a swindler." 67 At trial,
defendant's counsel wanted to prove the truth of
the matters charged in the libel;6 8 but the court
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insisted otherwise, and Clap was convicted. He
moved for a new trial, arguing that
to publish the truth from good motives, and for justifiable
ends, whether it bears... on public officers or on private
citizens cannot be libellous. 69

Representing him before the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, Otis argued, inter alia, that there
was a public interest in knowing the truth in this
instance, since the person defamed was a public
officer. The other side rebutted on the basis of
common law precedents, and added that the public
officer exception sought for was not applicable
here. The court ruled:
The cause why libellous publications are offences against
the state, is their direct tendency to a breach of the public
peace... A man may maliciously publish the truth against
another, with the intent to defame his character, and if the
publication be true, the tendency of it to inflame the passions..

.may

sometimes be strengthened ... The defendant

cannot justify himself for publishing a libel, merely by proving the truth of the words in this case to be a justification ... the evidence at the trial might more cruelly defame
[the auctioneer] than the original libel.70

But, the opinion continued:
A man may apply by complaint to the legislature to remove
an unworthy officer; and if the complaint be true, and made
... not maliciously ... the complaint will not be a libel ...

And when any man shall consent to be a candidate for
public office conferred by election of the people, he must be
considered as putting his character in issue, so far as it may
respect his ... qualifications for the office. And publications
of truth on this subject, with the honest intention of informing the people, are not a libel... And every man holding a
public elective office may be considered as within this principle. 7'

Clap's conviction was upheld, but only because the
auctioneer was an appointed officer.
More in the traditional mold was the 1811 case,
The State u Lehre. The South Carolina Court of
Appeals began with the observation that:
All the great expounders of the law, from Lord Coke, down
to Mr Justice Blackstone,72 have uniformly laid it down as a
rule of the common law, that the truth of a libel cannot be
given in evidence in a criminal proceeding; and this rule has
73
never been departed from in a single instance.

The court then gave two arguments to buttress the
position that
There does not exist in the whole system of our laws, a rule
better supported by reasons than the one under consideration .71

First came the familiar notion,
A libel is an offence, not because it is false, but because it

tends to provoke quarrels and. .. the objects therefore of
punishing a libel are to preserve the public peace and to
enforce a due submission to the laws.7 5

The second reason given for the rule barring the
truth from evidence was that:
It serves to protect from public exposure secret infirmities... which have been repented of and forgiven... a woman-

... who may have yielded to some seducer, or even been
the willing servant of vice, may have since become the
faithful partner of some worthy man and the mother of a
virtuous offspring... And she is in the enjoyment of the
esteem and respect of all her neighbors. Will anyone say
that these expiated sins may be ... presented to the view of
an unfeeling world; be punished afresh by disgrace and
odium, in which innocent connexions must participate; and
that the author of all this misery may justify the act by
76
showing the truth of the charges?

The rigidity of this point of view was outside the
main line of the cases. We can see the proof of this
statement in an 1825 case which is the most comprehensive display of both the traditional viewpoint
and of how much the American mistrust of powerholders had modified it. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts prosecuted one Blanding for having
charged, in his report of an inquest,77 that the death
of a guest at an inn kept by one Fowler had been
caused by the latter's serving him a large quantity of
liquor:
Evidence of the truth of the charges contained in the article
was rejected ... The jury were instructed ... that the mali-

cious intent charged in the indictment was an inference of
law, it not being competent for the defendant to prove the
truth of the fact alleged.78

After a verdit was returned for the Commonwealth,
the defendant moved to set it aside, and for a new
trial. Denying the motion, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said:
As to that part of the instructions of the judge which states
that the malicious intentcharged in the indictment . .. wasin
inference of law; this is certainly the common law doctrine,
and it has never been repealed ... and if the doctrine be true
that the gist or essence of the offense of libel is, that it tends
to provoke a breach of the peace, and this certainly is
maintained in all the books, then it must follow that where
the publication complained of is of a libellous nature, it must
79
be taken to be of a malicious character.
The court cited the Clap decision80 to show that

true and non-malicious reports of proceedings in
courts of justice and legislative assemblies were
privileged. Moreover, it reiterated:
If the truth only is told of public elective officers, or of
acknowledged candidates for office, in a decent manner and
with a view properly to influence an election, it is justifiable.81
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Freedom of the press was defined in traditional
terms:

are calculated to bring him into general contempt, and then
justify himself, by stating his authority and proving the statement.87

It is immaterial to the character of a libel asa public offense,
whether the matter of it be true or false ... Nor does our
constitution abrogate the common law in this respect. The
sixteenth article declares that "The liberty of the press ...
ought not ... to be restrained." The liberty of the press;
not its licentiousness; this is the construction which [is]

The road to the establishment of such a justification
was often strewn with legal obstacles.
The courts, however, applied the following rule:

just . . . This provision ... was intended to prevent ... pre-

vious restraints on publications.. . The liberty of the press
was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be
82
responsible in case of its abuse.

Yet the opinion declares that, unless malicious,
[h]ad the inquisition been published without any defamatory
comment, it certainly would not have furnished ground for
83
this prosecution.

To the objection
that this is a matter of public concern ... the answer is, that
the defendant did not select a proper vehicle for the com84
munication.

Any other holding would openn the door wide to
reckless libels on any matter of public concern. To
the objection that the aggrieved party could recover
damages in a civil suit if he were injured by such
recklessness, the court opposed the uncertainty
and troublesomeness of the remedy. Yet even here,
the court admitted the possible existence of.
extreme cases, such as that of a druggist selling
poison in the form of medicine, where a newspaper
would be the proper forum to air the charges.
Admittedly, the court concludes that this
is a case where the defendant cannot be allowed to excuse
himself by showing the truth of the accusation which he has
85
unjustifiably made.

This is, in fact, a conservative decision which
merely restates fully the existing law; but those
portions of that law developed in America, as the
court says,
go far to render harmless that most decried rule, that the
86
truth is no defense in a prosecution for libel.

In civil cases, where the offense presumably
posed less of a threat to the stability of the country,
the courts were more early persuaded that (if the
proper conditions were met) the truth of a libel
would justify the publishing of it. There is only one
case replete with political overtones, which could
be read to deny the right of such justification altogether. This was the 1814 ruling of the Circuit Court
for Pennsylvania that:
No man is at liberty to trifle with the repose of another, by
publishing to the world charges against his character, which

The justification must be confined to the words charged to
88
have been spoken.

Thus, a defendant who had charged a plaintiff with
bestiality with a horse was not permitted to prove
the commission of it with a cow. 89 At the same time,
the defendant had to define very narrowly what he
was going to prove. In a Kentucky case, Samuel
said: "Bond is a thief; he has stolen corn." 90 When
sued by Bond for slander, the defendant's plea in
justification 91 was rejected. The state Court of
Appeals upheld this action, saying:
The plea which wa... . rejected by the Court... is... "The

defendant... says that the plaintiff aforesaid his action
ought not to have ... because ... the said plaintiff is a thief,
and this he is ready to verify; &c." This plea is evidently
defective ... To make this plea a good justification, the
defendant in the court below should have confessed the
speaking of the words, and alleged that the plaintiff was
guilty of a felony of that species mentioned in the declara92
tion.

This opinion points up another hazard of offering
the truth justification: such a plea could be used as93
proof of the publication of the words charged.
Even more important, some courts held:
A plea of justification deliberately made and placed upon the
public records, and which the jury found was unwarranted ... is to be regarded as a deep aggravation of the
4
slander.9

This doctrine had earlier been accepted in Ohio,
where the court in 1816, in Wilkinson v Palmer held:
If the defendant's plea in justification is not supported by
evidence, his putting such a plea on the record is geatly in
aggravation of the damages, and it isat this hazard that such
95
a plea is always put in.

In short, some courts held, the justification
plea ...is not only a confession, but a repetition of the injury

complained of, in a more aggravated form.96

Moreover, justification required meeting a strict
standard of proof. For example, one Beniss published of a man named Brooks:
In open court, under the solemnities of an oath, this paltry
but ambitious politician ... tesfified to the existence of a fact,
which a jury of his own country, of whom eleven were
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democrats too, declared by their verdict they did not
believe.9"

Beniss offered numerous witnesses to testify that
they had disbelieved Brooks, and that he was
addicted to falsehood, but the court ruled:
The charge imputed that the plaintiff was a liar... That
charge cannot be justified by giving the opinion of one or
more individuals. Such a species of defence might lead to
the grossest ... calummy ... The defendant can only justify
98
the charge by proving the fact.

In Maybee u Avery, the slanderous words were an
accusation of having stolen a hen. The defendant
offered in evidence the plaintiff's conviction on the
charge of having stolen a hen. Although the reviewing court found this evidence admissible, it said:
However ... the verdict was not conclusive ... it was merely
prima facie proof and ... the plaintiff ought to have been
allowed to controvert the fact anew. Such a judgment would
only be conclusive when it came in question collaterally; not
when the issue was directly when the plaintiff was guilty of
the larceny or not.99

Any defendant planning to offer the truth in justification would have been well advised to make sure
his proof was "certain to a certain intent." 00
Furthermore, the truth justification could not be
pleaded under the general issue. The Vermont
Supreme Court expressed this view as early as 1801
in a brief per curiam opinion which apparently
accepted counsel's view that
the admission of such evidence under the general
issue' 0 ' ... must operate as a surprise upon the plaintiff;
[and] would bring on trial the conduct of his whole life, which
no man...could be presumed to [be] prepared to defend
instanter.02

This point was so well established that defendants
who pleaded the general issue normally tried to put
forth the truth of the words only in mitigation of
damages. They were consistently unsuccessful.
The complete opinion handed down by a New York
trial court in 1808 reads:
Under the general issue,the truth of the words can never be
given in evidence in mitigation of damages.1os

The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that the
reasoning behind this rule was the same as that
used to keep truth from the general issue as a
justification. 104 The New York Supreme Court
seems to have been on firm ground when it said in
1816:
No principle is better established, than that the truth of
slanderous words cannot be given in evidence under the

general issue, either as a defence, or in mitigation of the
damages. 05

The courts generally did accept the proposition
that:
Evidence which falls short of a justification, may be competent to mitigate damages. .. the defendant, on the general
issue, may prow, in mitigation of damages, such facts... as
show a ground of suspicion. 06

Courts were eternally vigilant to make certain that
the facts offered did not show such strong grounds
of suspicion as to amount to a backhanded justification. Just this situation was before the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors in Treat u Browning. The
latter had accused the former of fornication and
bearing a bastard child. The defendant pleaded the
general issue.
The defendant offered,in mitigation of damages to prove, by
the testimony of sundry witnesses, that... the plaintiff had
frequently left her bed in her father's house in the nightseason, and lodged in bed with a young man in an adjacent
store; that she had been detected in a wanton and lascivious
situation with the same young man, in a secret place, in a
field, among broom-corn, and at another time, in a similar
situation, with the same young man, upon a haymow in a
barn. This testimony, being objected to, by the plaintiff, was
rejected by the judge. 0

Upon being convicted, Browning moved for a new
trial on the ground that this evidence should have
been received in mitigation. The court, after summarizing the rejected testimony, said:
The above facts, by a strongly probable presumption, establish the truth of the words alleged ... These facts all lead to
the same conclusion. If anything short of this were intended
to have been done in those places of secrecy and suspicious
omen, it should have been definitely mentioned..The evidence offered ... amounts to a justification ... and without
08
notice, the truth of the charge is not admissible.

The modern standards for the truth defense in
civil actions had still to be formulated. It would be an
overstatement to say that the law on the criminal
side was fixed; but there, the directions in which
development would take place were fairly clearly
marked. The weight of the evidence seems to lend
support to the conclusion that the greater relative
speed of development in the criminal area was a
measure of the fact that fears about the abuse of
power by politicians, growing in response to the rise
of party conflict, were urgent ones - exacerbated
by fears of the consequences of a lack of public
spirit among citizens.
Such a conclusion is further supported by the
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wide protection given to petitions and judicial proceedings. In this sense, the course of the development of the law of libel fits nicely into the political era
which produced such expressions of fear about the
fragility of the republic as Washington's denunciation of the "self-created" societies and Jefferson's
vigorous enforcement of the Embargo. It would be

arrogant historical over-simplification to assert that
every legal, political, and moral phenomenon of this
period can be illuminated by the intellectual beacon
of "virtue." 09
' It would be legalistic myopia to fail to
search for the political, moral, and intellectual forces which shaped the picture reflected by that
social mirror, the law.E
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York 1970; reprints of essays from 1799 and 1803). "Profound effect was produced by [these] two pamphlets."

Charles Warren, The Early Law Of Criminal Libel In
Massachussets 27 MassLQ 10 (1942); dissenting opinion
of Mr Justice Holmes in Abrams v US 250 US 616, 630
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The attorney general, however, did not move for a judgment on the verdict. The following year New York passed
a statute which provided (3 Johns 412):
That in every prosecution for writing or publishing any
libel, it shall be lawful for the defendant, upon trial of the
cause, to give in evidence, in his defence, the truth of
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In consequence of this declaratory statute, the court
... unamimously awarded a new trial: id at 413.

50 Id at 383. The court says that this ruling meets the standards of Thorn supra note 23.
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75 Id at 53.
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a manner as to,... cause mental suffering, shame or
humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
Hull v Curtis Publishing Co 125 A2d 644,646 (Penn 1956).
See also Reardon v News Journal Co 164 A2d 263, 266
(Del 1960).
The right of privacy is not a branch of the law of
defamation ... In actions to recover damages for defamation, truth is a defense; in actions to recover damages for invastion of privacy it is not. Damages in
actions of defamation are for an injury to reputation,
while damages in actions for invasion of privacy are for
injury to one's own feelings.
Hull at 650 n. See generally: Korn v Rennison 156 A2d 476
(Conn 1959); Grushcus v Curtis Publishing Co 342 F2d
775, 776; (US 1965); Stedrig v Battistoni 208 A2d 559, 562;
(Conn 1964); Aquino v Bulletin Co 154 A2d 422 (Penn
1959); Biederman's of Springfield Inc v Wright 222 SW2d
892, 895 (Mo 1959).
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Power Of Juries On Trials ... For ... Libels 55-6 (London

1770). This matter was resolved in 1792 by Fox's Act,
which provided that (Hatch, Statutes, 122):
On the trial of. .. any libel, where an issue or issues are
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with

respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it
be true or false; since the provocation, and not the
falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally: though,
doubtless, the falsehood of it may aggravate its guilt.
The State v Lehre 4 Hall's AmLJ 48, 50 (SC 1811).
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Juries, in all criminal prosecutions, have an undoubted
right to try the whole matter in issue before them; and
nothing can be more absurd, than to suppose that
juries, in trials for libels,are to find a fellow-citizen guilty
of a crime, though they have noconviction of hishaving
done anything criminal; for if they find nothing but the
mere facts of writing, printing, or publishing, they find
nothing that necessarily involves in it the least degree of
criminality.
Joseph Towers Observations On The Rights And Duty Of
Juries In Trials For Libel 7-8 (London 1784). See also
Francis Maseres, An Inquiry Into The Extent Of The

Courts seem to have adopted with little variation the rule
that fair accounts of judicial proceedings were not actionable, but that commentary in such report was. Typical
examples are: Thomas v Croswell 7 Johns 264, 272-3 (NY
1810); The State v Lehre supra note 73 at 55; Clark v
Binney 19 Mass (2 Pick) 113, 117 (1824). Cf Paul P Ashley
Say It Safely 50-51 (Seattle, 1969). Robert H Phelps and E
Douglas Hamilton 126 Libel (New York 1966). This is an
excellent practical manual on where the law stands today.
English pamphleteers waged a bitter campaign against this
doctrine. They argued:

... and.. not be required or directed... to find the

defendant or defendants guilty, merely on proof of the
publication...of the paper charged to be a libel, and of
the sense ascribed to the same... Provided always,
that... the court ... shall... give. .. directions to the

jury.. .as in other criminal cases.
In the United States, the character of the publication was
almost always left to the jury; in fact, plaintiffs seem to have
been even more insistent on this than defendants. As
typical examples, see: Genet v Mitchell supra note 17;
Vigours v Palmer supra note 40; Dexter v Spear (RICC
1825) 7 FedCas 624 No 3, 867; Levy Legacy supra note 59
at 28. As an atypical example, consider the following from
US v Callender supra note 15 at 253:
Chase: We all know that juries have the right to counsider the law, as well as the fact - and the constitution
is the supreme law of the land, which controls all laws
which are repugnant to it. Wirt for [Callender]: Since,
then, the jury have a right to consider the law,and since
the constitution is law, the conclusion is certainly syllogistic, that the jury have a right to consider the constitution. Chase: A non sequitur, sir.
79

Commonwealth v Blanding 15 Am December 214, 216
(Mass 1825). The preceding quotation is at 215.

80

Supra note 67.

81

Blanding supra note 79 at 220.

82

Id at 218. This is a very close paraphrase of Blackstone.
Jones Commentaries supra note 72 at 2338.

83

Id Blanding supra note 67 at 222.

84

Id at 223.

Id at 224.
86 Id at 219. In 1827, Massachusetts provided by statute:
That in every prosecution for writing and publishing
any libel, it shall be lawful for any defendant upon trial of
the cause to give in evidence in his defence, the truth of
the matter contained in the publication charged as
libellous: Provided, always, that such evidence shall
not be a justification, unless on the trial it shall be
further made satisfactorily to appear, that the matter
85
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charged as libellous was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends.
The passage of this act marked the removal of the last
substantial legal restriction upon the freedom of the
press in Massachusetts.
Duniway Freedom supra note 61 at 159-60.
The policy of liberality had... been established by the
constitutions of Mississipi (1817), Connecticut (1818),
Missouri (1820), and New York (1821). (Id at 158 note
1).
Ronayne v Duane 20 FedCas No 12,028 (Penn CC 1814).
Duane was the editor of a highly partisan "Aurora". Even
so, it is more than probable that the court was holding only
that the truth justification, though admissible, also
required a showing of lack of malice.
Frederitze v Odenwalder 7 Penn (2 Yeates) 243 (1797);
this is one of our rare nisi prius cases. For an even stricter
statement of the rule, see Kerr v Force 3 DC (3 Cranch
CC) 8, 14 FedCas 386 No 7,730 (1826). JQ Adams had
endorsed the allegedly forged note in this case. Cf Phelps
Libel supra note 77 at 110.
Andrews v Vanduzer 11 Johns 38 (NY 1814).
Samuel v Bond 16 Ky 158 (1812).
Depending on the statutes and court rules of the state
involved, a plea in justification on a charge of theft would
be roughly to the tenor and effect following, to wit:
And the said C D, by E F his attorney, comes and
defends the wrong and injury, when, &c. and says that
he is not guilty of the premises above laid to his charge,
in manner and form as the said A B hath above hereof
complained against him. And of this he the said C D
puts himself upon the country. [So far, we have pleaded
the general issue, which could be done alone. See
below.] And for a further plea in this behalf as to the
speaking and publishing of the said several words of
and concerning the said A B as in the said courts
mentioned, the said C D by leave of the court here for
this purpose first had and obtained, according to the
form of the statute in such case made and provided,
saith that the said A B ought not to have or maintain his
aforesaid action thereof against him, because he says,
that the said A B before the speaking and publishing to
the said several words, of and concerning him the said
A B, as in the said counts mentioned, to wit, on, April 3,
1973, at the Yale Law School Library did feloniously
steal, take and carry certain goods and chattels, to wit,
one paper on libel law between 1787 and 1825, of one E
F of great value, to wit, of the value of 10 wherefore he
the said C D afterwards, to wit, at the said several times
in the said counts mentioned, at, the Yale Law School
Faculty Lounge aforesaid, did speak and publish the
said words of and concerning the said A B,as in the said

counts mentioned, as he lawfully might for the cause
aforesaid. And this he the said C D is ready to verify;
wherefore he prays judgement, if the said A Bought to
have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against
him.
Chittys Pleading supra note 32, at 504.
92 Samuel supra note 90 at 159.
93 Jackson v Stetson 15 Mass 49 (1818). The second section
of the 1827 Massachusetts statute supra note 86 reads:
Be if further enacted, That in all actions... for writing
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and publishing any libel, and in all actions for slander
wherein the defendant or defendants may plead the
general issue, and also in justification that the words
written and published or spoken were true, such plea in
justification shall not be held or taken as evidence that
the defendant or defendants wrote and published or
spoke such words or made such charge. Nor shall such
plea of justification, if the defendant or defendants fail
to establish it, be of itself proof of the malice of such
words...
Duniway Freedom supra note 61 at 159. See Hix v Drury
22 Mass (5 Pick) 296, 303.
Clark v Binney 19 Mass (2 Pick) 113, 121 (1824).
Wilkinson v Palmer (Ohio 816) Tapp 66,69. Chitty Pleading supro note 32, I, at 487, agrees.
Alderman v French 18 Mass (1 Pick) 1, 9 (1822).
Beniss v Brooks 8 Johns 356 (NY 1811).
Id at 358. But Beniss won a new trial on other grounds.
Maybee v Avery 18 Johns 352, 355 (NY 1820). But the
plaintiff was denied a new trial.
Kerr v Force supra note 88 at 393 quoting Lord Coke.
See ante note 91, and note that up to the brackets, we
have not given the plaintiff any indication at all of what
ground we plan to put our defense on.
Barns v Webb 1 Tyler 17, 17-18 (Vt 1801).
Else v Ferris Anthon's NP 36 (NY 1808). As a typical case
see Samuel v Bond supra note 90 at 159; as an atypical
case see Cooke v O'Brien 2 Cranch CC 17,6 FedCas 438
No 3, 177 (DCCC 1810).
Alderman v French supra note 96 at 17.
Shepard v Merrill 13 Johns 475 (NY 1816).
Bailey v Hyde 3 Conn 463, 466 (1820). Another example is
Buford v M'Lung 1 Nott &McC 268, 271 (SC 1818).
Treat v Browning 4 Conn 408, 410 (1822).
Idat 418. The opinion cites Bailey v Hyde supra note 106.
Cf George Bancroft, V History Of The United States Of
America 121 (New York, 1885).

